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The Special Safeguard Mechanism was a key issue in the 
July 2008 failure to reach agreement in the World Trade 
Organization negotiations under the Doha Development 
Agenda. It includes both price and quantity-triggered 
measures. This paper uses a stochastic simulation model 
of the world wheat market to investigate the effects of 
policy makers implementing policies based on the Special 
Safeguard Mechanism rules. As expected, implementation 
of the quantity-triggered measures is found to reduce 
imports, raise domestic prices, and boost mean domestic 
production in the Special Safeguard Mechanism regions. 
This paper—a product of the Agriculture and Rural Development Team, Development Research Group—is part of a 
larger effort in the department to understand the implications of proposed policy reforms for the agricultural sector. 
Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted 
at wmartin1@worldbank.org.  
However, rather than insulating countries that use it from 
price volatility, it would actually increase domestic price 
volatility in developing countries, largely by restricting 
imports when domestic output is low and prices 
high. This paper estimates that implementation of the 
quantity-triggered measures would shrink average wheat 
imports by nearly 50 percent in some regions, with world 
wheat trade falling by 4.7 percent. The price measures 
discriminate against low price exporters—many of whom 
are developing countries—and tend to increase producer 
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Potential Implications of a Special Safeguard Mechanism in the WTO: 
The Case of Wheat 
 
The Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) was a key issue in the July 2008 failure to 
reach agreement in the WTO negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda. The 
draft agreement (WTO 2008a) would allow members to impose specified additional 
duties when the total volume of imports of an agricultural product exceeds a specified 
trigger level, or when import prices from a particular supplier fall below a trigger price. 
Given the substantial potential gains available under these negotiations (Martin and 
Mattoo 2008), the fact that the negotiations were unable to proceed for lack of consensus 
on this issue highlights its importance to many WTO members. Wolfe (2009, p1) 
attributes the breakdown of negotiations on this issue primarily to inadequate analysis of 
its operation and its implications. The availability of analysis based specifically on the 
proposed measure was certainly limited by the fact that the proposed SSM (WTO 2008a) 
is one of the most technically complex aspects of the entire Modalities; that it attempts to 
deal with variations in prices, rather than—as with tariffs—merely their level; and that it 
was presented to Ministers only days before the meeting.  
Agricultural producers in developing countries are vulnerable to shocks both 
domestically—particularly from weather-related shocks to output—and from shocks to 
international markets. However, it must be remembered that consumers in developing 
countries are also particularly vulnerable to shocks to food prices, given that the poorest 
people spend as much as three quarters of their incomes on food. Policy measures that 
raise the price of food by imposing an import duty may help farmers whose incomes have 
fallen due to a harvest shortfall, but will do so at the expense of net buyers of food—
including many farmers—as they will be hurt by the increase in the price of food. If 
farmers are isolated from world markets by poor infrastructure and communications, an 
even worse possibility emerges in which protection raises the cost of food to poor 
consumers linked to world markets, while providing little or no benefit to producers in 
more isolated locations. This highlights the need for careful analysis of the impact of 
special safeguards taking into account the potential differentiation between imported and 
domestic goods.    3
It is important to consider the implications of the measure for global markets 
since the SSM would apply to all developing countries, which now account for two-thirds 
of the value of world agricultural production
1. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to 
assess the global implications of the proposed price- and quantity-based SSMs for a key 
agricultural staple, wheat, taking into account not just its direct impacts on import prices 
but also the resulting impacts on world prices when the measure is used by many 
developing countries at the same time. Our analysis also traces through the resulting 
impacts on key variables such as the volume of imports, domestic producer prices and the 
returns to land on which the incomes of many farm households depend. We consider the 
impacts of the SSM on the average level, and the volatility, of these variables, since part 
of the motivation for the measure appears to be to reduce the volatility of outcomes by 
offsetting shocks from international markets. 
Countries are allowed to use just one of the P-SSM and Q-SSM measures in any 
given year. While it would be interesting to consider a situation in which countries 
choose between the price-based and quantity-based measures at each point in time, it is 
not clear which option policy makers would choose when both are available. Therefore, 
we focus on the important prior objective of assessing the P-SSM and Q-SSM taken 
separately. 
We begin by examining some of the key prior contributions to the literature on the 
use of special safeguards.  We then consider the nature of the specific proposals under 
consideration. We follow this with a diagrammatic assessment of the qualitative effects 
of such interventions, including an analysis of the extent to which it might be used. 
Finally, we use an empirical model to estimate the potential implications of the SSM for 
global and domestic markets. 
 
What Does the Literature Say? 
While much technical work was available at the time of the Ministerial, many key 
questions had either not been asked, or had not been satisfactorily resolved. Important 
papers by Montemayor (2007, 2008) and Valdés and Foster (2005), focused on the broad 
potential impacts of different duty rates on imports into individual countries, without 
                                                 
1 Estimate based on the share of world agricultural GDP in World Bank low and middle income countries.   4
taking into account the potential impacts on world markets. Not surprisingly, much of 
this initial work focused on the frequency with which such a measure could be used, with 
less attention to the question of whether it would achieve underlying economic goals 
motivating the SSM, such as moderating the impact of commodity market volatility on 
the incomes of farmers or to the living costs of poor consumers.  
The analysis of Valdés and Foster (2005, p3) rules out the quantity-based measure 
a priori based on the argument that increases in import quantities are likely to be due to 
declines in harvests, making it difficult to justify restrictions on imports. They also 
express concern about the difficulties for developing countries in maintaining data on 
imports, and the inevitable lags between increases in imports and the implementation of 
any safeguard measures.  
Finger (2009) raises a number of other important questions about the proposed 
SSM. Would, for instance, the mechanical trigger rules for the SSM allow import duties 
to be imposed when import prices are constant or rising? What objectives of the SSM 
would be consistent with such mechanical rules? And would use of the quantity trigger 
reduce—or actually increase—the variability of domestic prices by raising duties in 
periods of short domestic supply? He also raises questions about the shipment-by-
shipment nature of the duty calculation under the price-based measure. When duties 
allowed under this measure are calculated by comparing the price of each shipment with 
the average price of all shipments, he finds that the nations exporting relatively lower-
priced products—typically developing countries— would likely face considerably higher-
than-average safeguard tariffs. The study by de Gorter, Kliauga and Nassar (2009) 
suggests that, under both the quantity and the price trigger, the overwhelming majority of 
invocations of the SSM in the four major markets of China, India, Indonesia and the 
Republic of Korea would be against exports from developing countries.  
An important step forward in analysis of the proposed SSM was taken by Grant 
and Meilke (2009), who take into account the potential impact of the SSM as proposed in 
the July 2008 Modalities on international, as well as domestic, prices. Those authors find 
that application of the SSM increases the volatility of world prices. Although they believe 
that the impacts on world markets overall would be fairly modest, several developing 
countries – most notably in the Middle East – experience large increases in the volatility   5
of their domestic prices. Due to their use of a net trade model (imports are not linked to 
particular exporters), these authors were unable to deal with the issue raised by Finger 
(2009) regarding the discriminatory nature of a P-SSM when it comes to lower priced, 
developing-country exports.   
In the framework outlined below, we enrich the analysis of Grant and Meilke 
(2009) by incorporating the important features of key agricultural products such as wheat, 
which show evidence of strong differentiation by country of origin (Uri and Beach, 1997).  
This differentiation is partly due to differences in physical qualities of wheat from 
different countries and partly due to less tangible factors such as differences in the terms 
and conditions of sale, and results in price differences that will influence the extent to 
which the price-based triggers are invoked. Therefore, in this paper, we examine the 
price-based SSM and the quantity-based SSM within a modeling framework that allows 
for differences in relative prices of exports from different suppliers, thereby permitting us 
to test Finger’s hypothesis of discrimination against developing country exporters.  
 
Features of the Proposed Safeguard 
The impacts of a SSM are likely to depend substantially on its specific design features. 
The SSM under discussion (WTO 2008a) is broadly based on the special agricultural 
safeguard (SSG), which includes two triggers—one based on the price of imports and one 
on the volume of imports (GATT 1994, p43). In contrast with standard WTO safeguards 
under Article XIX of GATT, there is no requirement to demonstrate that imports have 
caused injury to domestic producers.  
The price-based safeguard (P-SSM) uses a reference price based on a three-year 
moving average of import prices from all sources (WTO 2008a). When the price of an 
individual shipment falls below 85 percent of the reference price, a duty can be used to 
remove 85 percent of the shortfall. A potentially important feature of this shipment-by-
shipment trigger is that it will impose higher duties on imports from lower priced 
exporters. Finger (2009) and de Gorter, Kliauga and Nassar (2009) argue that the price-
based safeguard measures generally impose higher duties on exports from developing 
countries.    6
The volume-based safeguard (Q-SSM) can be used when imports in a year exceed 
“base imports”—a rolling average of imports in the preceding three year period
2. The 
duty that can be applied increases as imports exceed this base. Imports between 110 and 
115 percent of the base allow an additional duty of 25 percent of the current binding or 
25 percentage points. Imports between 115 and 135 percent of the base allow an 
additional duty of 40 percent of the binding, or 40 percentage points; while imports above 
135 percent of the base allow an additional duty of 50 percent of the binding, or 50 
percentage points. A volume-based safeguard can only be imposed for two years, and, if 
it is used twice in succession, cannot be used for another two years. If an SSM duty is 
imposed, and imports are lower than in the period before imposition, the trigger level is 
not reduced—thus avoiding a potential outcome where use of the duty itself causes the 
trigger to decline.  
The draft Modalities do not, in general, permit total applied duties to exceed the 
pre-Doha limit. A major focus of debate has been on exceptions to this limit for the 
quantity safeguard, and two specific proposals have been advanced. The “Lamy 
compromise” would have permitted duties to exceed the bindings by 15 percentage points 
on 2.5 percent of tariff lines when imports exceeded the base by 40 percent (ICTSD 
2008). The proposal by the G-33 (2008) and its negotiating partners would permit tariffs 
up to 30 percent (or percentage points) above the pre-Doha bindings on 7 percent of tariff 
lines, when imports exceed 110 percent of base levels. The draft modalities (2008a, para 
145) consider increases of 15 percent above the bound rate or 12 percent above the bound 
rate.  
In the next section, we examine the qualitative implications of using the quantity 
and price-based safeguards as a guide to understanding the model-based results in 
subsequent sections. 
 
Qualitative Impacts of Using the Price and Quantity Triggers 
The impacts of using a price-based safeguard in a small, trading economy are 
straightforward. To see this, it is useful to consider first the market for a single imported 
                                                 
2 Since imports in any one year are compared against a three-year moving average of past imports, steady 
growth in imports of 5 percent per year compounds to a “surge” in imports of over 10 percent, against 
which a safeguard can be imposed.   7
food crop, such as that shown in Figure 1. The domestic supply of the good is shown by 
the curve S, while the demand is represented by curve D. The world price falls from an 
initial level of p0   to p1. If a duty of t is introduced, the decline in the domestic price can 
be completely offset
3. A partially offsetting levy that diminished the size of the reduction 
in domestic prices by 85 percent would reduce the variance of domestic prices in 
response to this type of shock to 2 percent of its original level.  
Imports would, of course, decline relative to their level without the safeguard. 
Had domestic prices fallen from p0 to p1, imports would have increased from (q0 – d0) to 
(q1 – d1). For a small economy in which producer output is distributed independently of 
world output, average farm income would rise and the variability of farm income would 
decline. The average cost of food to consumers would rise because of the safeguard tariff, 
but the variability in the cost of food would decline. Consumers eat less food because of 
its higher price, which generates an economic cost measured by area def in Figure 1. 
Another cost—measured by area bcg—arises because lower-cost imports are replaced by 
higher-cost domestic production. 
If such a measure is being introduced for a group of countries that is collectively 
large, then the world market price for this commodity is no longer constant. In this case, 
it is useful to consider import demand from the group of countries using the safeguard 
(ED), together with the export supply (ES) from the rest of the world, as illustrated in 
Figure 2. An increase in supply—perhaps from a large harvest—that shifts the excess 
supply curve from the rest of the world from ES to ES would, in the absence of a 
safeguard mechanism, cause the world price to decline from p0 to p1. The decline in 
prices in importing countries would cause their imports to increase from m0 to m1. If a 
safeguard measure reduces the decline in import prices in importing markets, the decline 
in world prices must be larger, because more of the price adjustment is forced onto the 
exporting countries. If 85 percent of the decline in world prices is offset by a safeguard 
measure, the increase in imports for any given reduction in world prices is reduced to 15 
percent of its level in the absence of safeguards. As a consequence, world prices must 
decline further, as illustrated by p2 in Figure 2. 
                                                 
3 Complete stabilization would require a full set of taxes and subsidies on imports and exports.    8
For the importing countries, the reduction in the world price to p2 resulting from 
the safeguard requires a second-round increase in the safeguard duty on top of that shown 
in Figure 1. For each country, the decline in the world price it faces is not just the initial 
reduction from p0 to p1 but that from p0 to p2 shown in Figure 2. Average world prices 
decline, since the measure sometimes increases—and never reduces—duties. Another 
key impact of the widespread use of a safeguard in importing countries is an increase in 
the volatility of world prices (see Tyers and Anderson 1992, p264).  
An important implication of the analysis in Figure 2 is that it may not be enough, 
when analyzing the impacts of introducing a safeguard covering all developing countries, 
to simply consider experience in the absence of a safeguard. Once the safeguard is 
introduced in a number of important markets, the volatility of world prices is likely to be 
greater than would otherwise be the case. If this effect is large, it will increase the 
probability that the safeguard will be triggered in any period. 
As noted in Fraser and Martin (2008) and in Valdés and Foster (2005), the 
implications of a quantity-based safeguard depend heavily upon the source of the shock. 
If the cause is a decline in world prices of the type shown in Figure 1, for instance, 
imports rise from (q0- d0) to (q1- d1). If this decline is large enough to trigger the volume-
based safeguard, then a volume-based safeguard could also be used as an alternative to a 
price-based safeguard. If the same additional duty were generated by either safeguard, 
then there would be no effective difference. Because the link between the size of the price 
decline and the tariff imposed under the Q-SSM is weak, this safeguard may permit a 
larger response than the price-based measure, and may even cause the domestic price to 
rise when the import price falls.  
If the world price does not decline, but imports increase, then the volume 
safeguard can be triggered even though the price-based safeguard is not. In this situation, 
it is very important to examine the cause of the increase in imports. In the case of 
agriculture, such an increase is likely to be due to either a shift in the domestic supply 
curve, such as a decline in the harvest associated with poor weather conditions— 
although increases in demand, as considered by Sen (1981), may also be important on 
occasion. The South Centre (2009, p2) concludes that over 85 percent of import surges   9
are not accompanied by declines in import prices, suggesting that most import surges are 
driven by domestic shocks, such as declines in domestic production.  
In Figure 3, we focus on a reduction in domestic supply. Domestic supply is 
initially shown by the supply curve S, which shows domestic production of q0 at price p0. 
Domestic demand is represented by curve D, and demand at price p0 by d0. Imports are 
initially given by (q0-d0). In the absence of a volume-based safeguard, a decline in 
domestic supply from S to S does not affect the domestic price. Imports increase to make 
up the increased gap between domestic demand and supply, allowing the domestic price 
to remain stable. If a volume-based safeguard is available, and is used, the effect is to 
apply an additional duty, and hence to raise the domestic price.  
Clearly, as is evident from Figure 3, the effect of a volume-based measure in this 
situation is to destabilize the domestic price. For consumers
4, the adverse impact on 
prices could have been avoided by importing to make up the shortfall. For producers, 
prices are destabilized, but revenues and net returns may be stabilized or destabilized. If 
the tariff imposed is slightly larger
5 than the decline in the quantity of output, producer 
gross revenues will be stabilized. However, the effect on producer net returns may be 
quite different, depending upon the nature of the shift in the supply curve (Martin and 
Alston 1994, 1997). 
It is clear that the imposition of a volume-based SSM would reduce imports 
below the level that would have prevailed in the absence of such a measure. In Figure 3, 
the initial level of imports is given by (d0- q0). Without a safeguard, imports would rise to 
(d0- q0'). It is clear that a safeguard will reduce imports below this level, perhaps to a 
level similar to (d1- q1'). Whether this is greater than or less than the initial level of 
imports is quite unclear. With the volume based safeguard, there is a link between the 
extent of import penetration before the imposition of the safeguard and the size of the 
duty that can be imposed in the following twelve months. An increase in imports of 35 
percent would allow imposition of an additional duty of 50 percentage points. If, as is 
usually assumed, the elasticity of demand for imports is relatively high at the tariff-line 
                                                 
4 It is important to note that—particularly in poor countries- consumers and producers are typically not 
distinct groups. Many farmers are net buyers of staple foods, and some households classified as urban for 
survey purposes are net sellers of these products (Ivanic and Martin 2008). 
5 For a small change in output, the proportional effect on producer revenues is given by dp/p + dq/q where 
dp and dq are the changes in prices and quantities. For larger changes, this effect is dp/p + dq/q + dp/p.dq/q   10
level, this may be enough to reduce imports substantially. However, given the short term 
nature of the measure, significant supply response is unlikely, reducing the probability 
that imports would be reduced below their initial level.  
 
How Might the SSM Be Used? 
Because the SSM provides an option, but not an obligation, to protect, it is difficult to be 
sure how frequently it might be utilized. One view is that most developing countries have 
considerable binding overhang, with their bound tariffs considerably above their applied 
rates, so it is unlikely that an SSM measure would make a significant difference to the 
protection allowed under WTO rules. Another is that decisions about the duties applied 
under an SSM are likely to be taken in a different forum from those regarding ordinary 
tariffs, and this may have real implications for choices about border protection. In many 
countries, applied tariff levels are decided by a tariff committee, which includes 
representation from different parts of government, and which frequently takes a broad 
view about the desirability of low tariffs for export competitiveness and the overall 
efficiency of the economy. If decisions about SSM duties are taken by a body with a 
narrower focus, there may be greater willingness to provide protection that benefits 
producers in a particular sector.   
One promising approach to assessing the extent of its likely utilization is to 
examine the frequency with which the special agricultural safeguard (SSG) provided 
under the Uruguay Round was used. Some studies have suggested that the SSG was 
applied very infrequently relative to the number of times that it might have been used. 
Morrison and Sharma (2005) conclude that the ratio of SSG invocations to cases where 
these were permitted under the SSG was about one percent. They suggested three reasons 
for non-application of these measures: (i) the complexity of the formulas, (ii) high tariff 
bindings in many developing countries, which make it feasible to raise applied tariffs or 
apply additional duties without exceeding bound rates, and (iii) that the costs of 
introducing such measures might have been judged to exceed the benefits.  
Several other reasons for the apparently limited use of the SSG have been offered. 
Finger (2009) notes that many major users of the SSG posted minimum prices when the 
Uruguay Round agreement came into effect. Under these circumstances, exporters knew   11
that pricing at a lower level would result in a duty, and so had a strong incentive to price 
at the minimum posted price so that the SSG would not be invoked. Another reason for 
low official notifications of SSG use appears to be that many members have ignored the 
requirement to report use of the SSG to the WTO’s Committee on Agriculture within 10 
days of implementation (Hallaert 2005). Despite this, Hallaert concludes that the use of 
the SSG has increased over time as WTO members become more familiar with its 
provisions.  
Another possible reason for limited use of the SSG is that it was frequently not 
politically attractive because of the weak relationship between its mechanical formulas 
and policy makers’ goals. While the quantity-based SSG might permit the use of 
safeguards following a crop failure, policy makers may not have wanted to use this 
measure under these circumstances because of pressure from consumers concerned about 
high food prices. 
We now turn to our empirical framework which permits a more thorough 
assessment and comparison of the implications of the proposed P-SSM and Q-SSM 
measures. 
 
Empirical Framework and Scenario Design 
Modeling Framework: For our analysis, we build on a paper by Valenzuela et al. 
(2007), which uses a stochastic simulation approach to validating Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) models, with a focus on the world wheat market. In this study, we 
employ a more recent version of the GTAP model that has been specifically tailored to 
agricultural applications (Keeney and Hertel 2005). Nicknamed “GTAP-AGR”, it 
incorporates segmented factor markets to mimic short run rigidities in supply response 
and more detailed information about supply and demand elasticities pertinent to 
agricultural production and food consumption. We use the Armington import demand 
specification with econometrically estimated elasticities of substitution between varieties 
of wheat in the model to allow for differentiation between wheat produced in different 
countries (Hertel, Hummels et al. 2008).  As we will see below, product differentiation by 
origin plays an important role in the price-based SSM.    12
Model Validation: Before using this model for analysis of alternative safeguard 
measures, we examine its performance relative to historical variation in production and 
prices. Here, we follow the approach proposed by Valenzuela et al. (2007). Table 1 
reports our findings. The first column under “production” is the regional standard 
deviation of wheat output reported in Valenzuela et al., 2007. Those authors used time 
series methods to decompose the non-systematic year-to-year variation in wheat output 
and then used the normalized standard deviation of these residuals to characterize the 
distribution of supply-side uncertainty in their model. From this column you can see that 
Australia and Brazil show the most volatile production, followed by Argentina and then 
Canada.  
Since demand for wheat is relatively stable and most shocks to the wheat market 
come from weather-induced shocks to production, we introduce supply-side shocks as 
shifts in supply curves for wheat in the model. Specifically, we shock total factor 
productivity in wheat in each of the model regions. Standard stochastic simulation 
techniques such as Monte Carlo procedures are cumbersome at best, given the large 
number of variables in the model so we follow Valenzuela et al. (2007), in approximating 
the distribution of supply shocks using Gaussian Quadrature. This has been shown to be 
an efficient means of assessing the consequences of stochastic variation parameters or 
shocks to CGE models (DeVuyst and Preckel 1997) and its implementation has been 
automated in the GEMPACK software used to solve our model (Arndt 1996; Pearson and 
Arndt 2000).  
The second column in Table 1 reports the model simulated production volatility, 
reported as the standard deviation in percentage change of output, from the baseline, 
assuming symmetric, independent distributions for wheat supply shocks in each of the 
model regions. By virtue of our sampling strategy, the model results for production are 
very close to the historical variation
6. The discrepancy between observed and simulated 
output volatility is greatest for China and for Canada where the standard deviations in 
year-to-year output changes differ by 3 percentage points. Because we are mainly aiming 
                                                 
6 In fact, we calculate the stochastic shocks to exogenous wheat productivity in each region by computing 
the shock to TFP required to achieve a given production change, thereupon translating the historical 
distribution of output shocks accordingly. Since this is a non-linear, general equilibrium model, this 
approach to calibration is imperfect, and there are some discrepancies between the historical and model-
based standard deviations in production.   13
for qualitative insights in this paper, we feel this modest deviation from historical 
variation is acceptable. 
The most important part of Table 1 is the price comparison offered in the right 
hand side panel of this table. Prices are endogenous functions of the supply shocks, 
operating in concert with the supply and demand elasticities
7. So asking whether the 
model is able to broadly reproduce historical price variation is a very interesting question. 
Comparing columns three and four of Table 1, we see that the model predicts too little 
price variation for the exporting regions: Argentina, Australia, Canada, USA, and Mexico 
(the latter is not an exporter, but it is well-integrated into the net exporting, NAFTA 
region). On the other hand, the model over-predicts price volatility in the historically 
insulated import markets of China, Japan, South Asia, and Brazil. Valenzuela et al (2007, 
Table 3) show that moving away from price-insulating policies to a regime of fixed tariffs 
would substantially reduce the volatility of the prices faced by exporters such as 
Argentina and the United States, while only marginally increasing the volatility of prices 
in importing markets such as China and Japan. This is because most of the reduction in 
the variability of domestic prices in importing countries resulting from the use of 
insulating policies is offset by the induced increase in the volatility of world prices. 
Valenzuela et al. (2007) correct for this by estimating price transmission equations for the 
major importing markets designed to mimic a whole range of price-insulating policies in 
these economies. However,  in this paper we seek to model such policies explicitly. 
Therefore, we forgo these adjustments and work with the model as is. 
Experimental Design: We perform three different sets of stochastic simulations 
for our analysis. The first set establishes our baseline (no-SSM). In this case, we assume 
that tariffs remain fixed at the level of scheduled applied tariff rates for 2001, except in 
those cases where countries had made international commitments to lower their WTO 
bound tariff rates—as in the case of China’s accession to the WTO—or made 
international commitments to lower tariffs on a preferential basis.   
 In our second set of stochastic simulations, we permit developing countries to 
invoke the Q-SSM, as detailed in the next section. Our analysis focuses on the differences 
                                                 
7 The demand elasticities used in this version of the model are intended to reflect a combination of demand 
for use in consumption and demand for stocks in the range where the SSM is likely to be applied.   14
between the means and standard deviations of key variables of interest, which are 
computed as the outcome under Q-SSM less the outcome under the baseline simulation. 
In the third, and final, set of stochastic simulations, we allow developing countries to 
implement the P-SSM measures as detailed below. Again, we focus on differences in 
mean and standard deviations, computed as P-SSM less the baseline value. Those 
interested in the mean and standard deviations of model variables under any individual 
policy regime (as opposed to the differences reported in the text) can find these in the 
appendix tables. 
The SSM duties considered in scenarios two and three would be distinct from—
and additional to—initial applied tariff rates, in the same way that anti-dumping duties 
and Article XIX safeguard duties are in addition to scheduled applied tariff rates. Many 
developing countries have the opportunity to raise applied rates relative to bindings, with 
China being a notable exception. Therefore, in the case of China, we have imposed a 
ceiling of 30 percentage points for the SSM duty, as has been proposed by the G-33 for 
cases where the applied tariff plus the SSM exceed the bound rate. All other regions are 
modeled according to the draft modalities, and applied tariffs plus the endogenously 
determined SSM remain below the bound rates in all cases. 
 
Implementing the Safeguards Proposal: The Quantity Trigger 
The quantity trigger permits developing countries to apply a tariff on imports whenever 
volumes reach 110% of a three year moving average. The resulting tariff can be as high 
as 25% of the bound tariff or 25 percentage points, whichever is higher. If imports exceed 
115% of the baseline, then the additional duty cannot exceed 40% of the bound tariff, or 
40 percentage points. Finally, in the third tier, 50% of the bound tariff or 50 percentage 
points is available once imports reach 135% of the baseline. In the case of China, where 
binding overhang has largely been eliminated, we allow for a duty of up to 30 percentage 
points, as proposed by the G-33 for cases where the combination of applied tariffs and the 
SSM duty exceeds the bound tariff.   
We model this quantity-based SSM as a non-linear complementarity problem. 
More specifically, letting  i T  be the SSM tariff, and  i QR  be the ratio of observed imports   15
to the trigger level of imports for SSM tier i= 1, 2, 3, we have the following 
complementary slackness condition:  
0( 1 )0 ii TQ R               which implies that either: 
 0,(1 ) 0 ii TQ R       (SSM is binding) or: 
0,(1 ) 0 ii TQ R       (SSM is non-binding) 
We adopt the 2001 benchmark year as the baseline level of imports. Therefore, in 
our subsequent analysis, countries are permitted to apply a tier 1 safeguard tariff once 
imports reach 110% of their 2001 levels. With the Q-SSM, we assume that—when 
imports reach but do not exceed a trigger level—the duty is adjusted to keep imports at 
that trigger level
8. The full duty permitted at a given trigger level is imposed only when 
imports exceed the specified trigger level. Attention then focuses on whether the next 
higher trigger is reached and the next higher duty imposed.  
Table 2 reports on the power of the SSM tariff (i.e., 1 + the ad valorem tariff rate) 
for both the Quantity-based and Price-based SSM scenarios. The Q-SSM columns relate 
to the tier 1 and tier 2 tariffs applied to imports from all sources, while the P-SSM 
columns report the bilateral changes in power of the SSM tariff under the P-SSM regime. 
In this section, we focus on the Q-SSM. For example, the mean power of the tier 1 SSM 
tariff in China is 9.7% higher than its value (simply 1.0) in the baseline (No-SSM) regime.  
When cif prices are unchanged, a one percentage point change in the power of the 
SSM tariff translates directly into a one percentage point change in the domestic price of 
imported wheat. In the absence of the SSM, this tariff – and hence the power of the tariff 
– is unchanged. However, when the SSM is present, all regions except for Other East 
Asia (where the SSM is always non-binding) show a positive mean change in the power 
of the tier-1 SSM tariff, ranging from 2.9% in MENA to 10.7% in Brazil, where domestic 
production is extremely volatile. Only China and Brazil invoke the tier-2 SSM tariff; the 
tier-3 tariff is not utilized in our simulations.
9 
                                                 
8 An alternative, and potentially much more trade-restrictive, scenario would involve imposing the full duty 
permitted whenever imports reached the trigger in the past twelve months, even if this results in imports 
falling below the trigger.  
9 It is also of interest to know how the SSM tariff would change if only a single region utilized the SSM. In 
separate simulations, not reported here, we have undertaken the stochastic simulations numerous times, in   16
Table 3 reports the changes in mean and standard deviations of key variables in 
Developing Country (WTO definition) markets:  SSM – No-SSM values, expressed as a 
percent of baseline values. There are two sets of columns for each variable: the P-SSM 
and Q-SSM on which we focus in this section. The developing country regions listed in 
Table 3 are the ones permitted to apply the SSM, and they are assumed to do so whenever 
imports reach 110% of baseline levels. If the second tier of safeguards is breached 
(imports reach 115% of baseline), then an additional tariff may be applied.  
By invoking the SSM tariff with some frequency, developing countries raise the 
mean, tariff-inclusive price of imported wheat over the course of the stochastic 
simulations. When the quantity-based SSM regime is imposed, the mean import price in 
China rises by 10.2%, relative to the mean import price in the absence of Q-SSM (see the 
Import Price Column of Table 3, Q-SSM entry). By restricting imports when domestic 
production is low and prices are high, the expected domestic price of imports rises 
significantly as compared to the No-SSM mean values across all markets, with the 
exception of Other East Asia. This is expected to have particularly adverse impacts on the 
urban poor, who tend to spend a higher share of their income on staple foods when 
compared to wealthier households. 
Now turn to the import quantity variable in Table 3, as reported in the second 
group of columns. Here, the expected value of imports into China is reduced under the Q-
SSM regime. To better understand this, it is useful to explain that, in the absence of an 
SSM regime, the expected value of imports in China is 41.1% above the base level 
(Appendix Table A1). This large, positive mean value arises because, when domestic 
production is low, the demand for imports is very strong; hence there is a large 
percentage increase from the base level. However, when domestic production is high, 
gross imports cannot fall below zero. So, the expected value of imports in a stochastic 
environment is higher than in the baseline. When we overlay the quantity-triggered SSM 
regime on this same stochastic production environment, the mean change in imports 
becomes negative, and equals -3.3% of the baseline import value for China (Appendix 
Table A1). So the difference, which is reported in Table 3, is -44.4%; that is, the presence 
                                                                                                                                                 
each case only permitting one of the regions to impose the tariffs. Not surprisingly, this results in lower 
mean tariffs in the SSM-invoking country. That is to say, the effect of all developing countries utilizing the 
SSM is to increase the frequency and intensity of single region safeguard tariffs.   17
of the Q-SSM regime reduces mean imports by more than 44% of base period volume in 
China. Other regions with large reductions in mean imports due to the Q-SSM regime are 
Argentina (-46.9%) and Brazil (-23.1%). Indeed, (again with the exception of Other East 
Asia) all the developing country regions show lower mean import volumes under the Q-
SSM regime. 
Not surprisingly, higher prices for imports translate into higher mean prices for 
domestic products (although the two are imperfectly linked due to the Armington, 
product-differentiation assumption), and higher mean returns to producers of wheat under 
the SSM scenario. For example, in China, mean wheat prices rise from 3.7% (Appendix 
Table A1: no SSM) to 8.4% (Appendix Table A1: SSM) for a difference of 4.7%, as 
reported under the domestic price/Q-SSM column in Table 3. This, in turn, boosts mean 
land rents under the Q-SSM in China’s wheat sector by 13.9% relative to their mean 
value in the absence of Q-SSM. Higher producer returns boost expected output – which is 
now 3.4% higher than under the No-SSM regime. Expected producer returns (land rents) 
rise in all developing country regions excepting OEASIA (see above) and Argentina, 
where they fall by -7.6% relative to the No-SSM case, because Argentina is a net 
exporter of wheat and producers are hurt by the SSM implementation in other countries. 
The largest increase in land rents between the two policy regimes is for Brazilian wheat 
producers (20.4% rise in mean land rents due to Q-SSM), but other gains are also 
substantial. Not surprisingly, the Q-SSM also results in higher mean wheat output in 
these regions, with the largest deviation from the non-SSM mean change arising in Brazil 
(4.6% higher under Q-SSM: Table 3: Output column). 
The top portion of Table 4 reports changes (SSM - non-SSM) for key variables in 
developed country wheat markets. Here, we see the mirror image of the developing 
country results. Mean output prices are lower, and mean land rents and output are lower 
in all of the developed country markets as a result of the Q-SSM. Mean import quantities 
are higher in all developed regions excepting Australia and Canada. On average, 
producers in these countries are adversely affected by the protection imposed in 
developing countries. In the case of Canadian wheat producers, for example, rather than 
rising by 8.1%, on average (Appendix Table A1), wheat land rents fall by 0.7% 
(Appendix Table A1) for a difference of -8.8%, relative to base land rents, as reported in   18
Table 4. Australian wheat producers show nearly as large a change in mean land rents as 
a consequence of the Q-SSM in developing countries. Consequently, expected output in 
the developed country markets is also lower under Q-SSM than under the No-SSM 
scenario (final column of Table 4). 
Globally, mean wheat trade volume is reduced sharply, with mean trade volume 
declining from 7.3% (No SSM) to just 2.6% (Appendix Table A5) under the quantity-
based SSM for a difference of -4.7%, as reported in Table 5
10 . The deviation in expected 
global wheat prices (Q-SSM – no SSM) reported in Table 5 is -0.8% due to the Q-SSM 
regime. 
Next, turn to the lower panels of tables 3-5 which focus on volatility of key 
variables in the global wheat market, measured as the changes in standard deviations for 
the same percentage change variables covered in the top panel, under the Q-SSM and No-
SSM regimes. For example, the standard deviation of the percentage change in the power 
of the tier 1 and tier 2 SSM tariffs on wheat imports into China are 11.6% and 1.8%, 
respectively, in the presence of the Q-SSM. Since these values do not change (remaining 
at their base values of 1.0) in the No-SSM case, this is also equal to the difference in the 
two standard deviations, as reported in the lower panel of Table 2. 
Volatility in the power of the SSM tariff, translates directly into volatility in 
import prices (inclusive of the tariff). The standard deviation of the domestic price of 
imports in China is 14.1% in the presence of the SSM, 4.1% with No-SSM (see Appendix 
Table A1), for a difference of 10%, as reported in the lower panel of Table 3. Import 
quantities are inherently quite volatile in many of these countries, with standard 
deviations suggesting that all regions (excepting Other East Asia) will regularly exceed 
the 110% tier 1 threshold in the Q-SSM proposal. In the absence of the SSM, the greatest 
import volatility is in China, which has a standard deviation in import volume equal to 
110.3% of baseline imports (see Appendix Table A1). Implementation of the SSM 
substantially reduces the volatility of imports into China, cutting the standard deviation to 
just half of this value (56.1%; see Appendix Table A1) so the change in standard 
deviation (Q-SSM – No-SSM) is equal to -54.2%. Argentina has a significant decline in 
                                                 
10 We also considered the impact on global wheat trade of applying the SSM in one country/region only, as 
has been the case in most previous studies which have offered single country analyses. In this case, the 
change in world wheat trade is very similar to the no-SSM case.   19
wheat import volatility equal to a -48.3% difference in the standard deviation of wheat 
imports. The reduction in wheat import volatility in Brazil is also striking, dropping from 
a standard deviation of 79.2% to 54.5% of baseline import levels (see Appendix Table 
A1) for a difference of -24.7% as reported in the lower panel of Table 3. Most of the 
other regions cut their import volume volatility index by nearly one-half translating into 
changes in standard deviations ranging from -6.9% to -9.9% (Other East Asia again 
excepted). 
When duties are imposed on import surges, domestic prices become more volatile 
(recall Figure 3), as shown in the next column in the lower panel of Table 3. In China, the 
standard deviation of domestic prices rises from 25% to 30.8% (see Appendix Table A1), 
for a difference of 5.8%, and in Brazil it rises from 46.2% to 50.5% (see Appendix Table 
A1) for a difference of 4.3% as reported in Table 3. The impact on producer returns as 
measured by land rents is more complex, with volatility increasing sharply in China and 
Brazil, but falling in Other East Asia, Mexico, Argentina, Rest of Latin America, as well 
as Africa and the Middle East. Finally, domestic output may be more stable under the 
SSM, since, in a bad year, when production is down and there is a strong incentive for 
imports to surge, this competing source of supply is frustrated by rising tariffs, thereby 
lending extra incentive to producers to offset the weather-induced decline in output.  
The bottom panel of Table 4 reports changes in the standard deviations of key 
market variables in the developed countries. These are little affected by the SSM regimes 
in developing countries. Prices are slightly more volatile in the wheat exporting regions 
of Australia, Canada and USA, and output slightly more stable under Q-SSM than under 
No-SSM, but the differences are quite small. This reflects the predominance of developed 
countries in global wheat trade. Globally, the volatility of wheat trade volume is slightly 
reduced under Q-SSM, while price volatility is slightly increased (Table 5). 
 
The Price Triggered SSM 
Under the Price-Triggered SSM, countries are allowed to implement a safeguard tariff 
when the import price on a shipment falls below 85% of the baseline level (three year 
average). Retaining the previous notation of T for the safeguard tariff and introducingPR  20
as the ratio of observed price per shipment to the price trigger, we have the following 
complementarity problem: 
0( 1 )0 TP R               which implies that either: 
 0,( 1) 0 TP R       (P-SSM is binding) or: 
0,( 1) 0 TP R      (P-SSM is non-binding) 
Note that, unlike the quantity-based system, there is only one tier in the price-based 
safeguard. In addition, the safeguard tariff imposed can only amount to 85% of the 
difference between the shipment price and the baseline price.  
There are two key differences between the price and quantity-triggered SSM 
regimes. The first has to do with bilateral price differences for wheat, and the second has 
to do with the focus of the P-SSM on shipments instead of annual-average imports. Both 
of these features are important to our findings, and so deserve special discussion at this 
point. Turning first to the bilateral price issue, we note that, because the price of each 
shipment of wheat is compared to an MFN average price in order to evaluate whether the 
SSM has been triggered, it is important to account for bilateral differences in commodity 
prices.  
To better understand these bilateral price differences, we compute average unit 
values for wheat exports from each region in the model over the period 2000-2004. These 
are reported in the first column of Table 6, as the ratio (PR) of each region’s export unit 
value, relative to the global average export price. The entries in Table 6 show a general 
tendency for developing countries to have lower prices and developed countries to have 
higher ones, as shown by Schott (2004) for exports in general. But this is not always the 
case, with some high-income regions specializing in lower-priced varieties of wheat and 
some poorer countries having higher unit values. Regions with lower than average wheat 
export prices include: China, South Asia, Argentina, Rest of Latin America, Rest of 
Europe, Russia and the EU. Regions with relatively high unit values include: Australia, 
Canada, USA, Japan, Mexico, Brazil and Sub-Saharan Africa (largely South Africa).  
The remainder of Table 6 uses these unit values and the bilateral trade pattern 
from 2001 to compute the ratio of a given bilateral exporter price to the average import 
price in each importing market (BIPR). Note that some exporters show significant   21
variation in the price of their product, relative to other suppliers, across destination 
markets. For example, Australian bilateral relative prices range from 0.98 in China to 
1.19 in Argentina. Canadian export price ratios vary from 1.02 to 1.24. In some cases (see 
italicized entries) this ratio falls below the 0.85 trigger point specified in the SSM. 
Therefore, we have truncated these values at 85% of the average import price for use in 
the empirical model, since values of BIPR below 0.85 are not permitted. For such 
exporter/importer pairs, any further decline in price will immediately trigger the SSM. In 
the case of high unit value exporters, (e.g., Canada), export prices will have to fall by 
more than 15% in order to trigger the SSM. 
The second key difference between the two SSM approaches has to do with the 
application of the price trigger on a shipment-by-shipment basis. This contrasts with the 
year-to-year price volatility reproduced by the model. The price of grain varies 
considerably both within a given year, and across suppliers, but much of this variability is 
averaged out in the annual statistics used in our modeling work. Thus, in the absence of 
any adjustments, our model would not invoke the bilateral, shipment-based safeguards 
with sufficient frequency.  
In an effort to remedy this problem, while retaining the same basic model 
structure, and retaining the capability to compare results between the price- and quantity-
based safeguards, we introduce a multiplicative factor:  rr k   which operates on the 
bilateral cif prices in the model in order to compute the appropriate price trigger: 
rs r rs ptrigger k pcif  . Setting the parameter  1.15    bridges the gap between annual 
price volatility and the monthly variations in price that we use as a proxy for the 
shipment-by-shipment volatility data that were not available. This factor was estimated 
using monthly price data for Canadian wheat over the period January, 1983 to June, 2008 
as a proxy for the prices of individual shipments
11. The second adjustment factor, r  , is 
indexed by exporting region, and brings bilateral annual prices in line with those 
observed over the historical period. Together these ensure that the frequency with which 
                                                 
11 We believe that the variability of prices across shipments is largely captured by the variability across 
suppliers and the intertemporal variability across months included in our analysis. However, we recognize 
that there are other elements, such as variation across wheat varieties, which make the variance across 
prices of shipments even greater than is captured in our analysis. Given this, we would expect the analysis 
to provide a lower-bound estimate of the frequency with which the P-SSM is invoked.    22
the bilateral price trigger will be activated more accurately represents the reality of this 
bilateral, shipment-based measure. 
Table 2 also reports the changes in the mean and the standard deviation of the 
power of the bilateral SSM tariff for the eight developing country regions.  Note that the 
safeguard tariff now varies, not only by importer (rows in the table), but also by the 
source country (exporters are listed in the columns of Table 2). The highest mean tariffs 
are imposed on the low-unit value exporters including Russia, China, Eastern Europe, 
South Asia and Argentina. The volatility ranking for the SSM tariffs is similar, as shown 
in the bottom panel of Table 2, which reports the standard deviation in the percentage 
change in the power of the price-based SSM tariff on each bilateral flow.  
The P-SSM columns in tables 3-5 report the changes (P-SSM – No-SSM) in 
means and standard deviations of key variables in developing and developed country 
markets. The first thing to note is that the price-based safeguard has a much more 
uniform impact on import prices than was the case under the quantity-based SSM regime 
– slightly raising mean prices in nearly all regions. This is because the bilateral SSM duty 
levied against any individual exporter is now less likely to vary across importers. With 
fob prices to all destinations changing at the same rate, the only differences in these price-
based, SSM duties arise due to differential trade and transport costs as well as differences 
in the weights determining the average import price for each region. Whereas the 
quantity-based SSM was largely driven by domestic supply shocks, the price-based SSM 
is primarily driven by supply volatility in the exporting countries. Since the composite 
import price is a blend of products from different exporters, there is much less variation 
in the mean import price changes under the P-SSM regime. The rise in mean import 
prices are also quite a bit smaller now, as the P-SSM is only imposed on a subset of the 
exporting regions, and most importers are rather diversified in their export sourcing of 
wheat. This stands in sharp contrast to the Q-SSM which applies to all import sources.  
With marginally higher mean (tariff-inclusive) import prices, mean import 
volumes are lower than in the No-SSM case, and mean domestic prices are higher than 
under the No-SSM regime in each of our developing country regions except Argentina, 
which relies heavily on exports that are now facing SSM tariffs in other developing 
countries. Higher domestic prices boost land rents, which translate into slightly higher   23
mean output in all developing country regions, save Argentina (top panel of Table 3). The 
expected change in global wheat exports falls from 7.3% (No-SSM) to 6.8% (P-SSM) 
(Appendix Table A5) for a difference of -0.5% as reported in Table 5, and there is no 
difference in mean global export price under P-SSM as compared to the No-SSM, as 
reported in Table 5.  
The bottom panels of tables 3-5 report the changes in standard deviations 
associated with the percentage changes in market variables in the developing and 
developed country markets, as well as for global trade. Import quantities are more 
volatile in five of the nine developing country markets due to P-SSM, while domestic 
prices are more volatile in seven of the developing country regions under P-SSM (as 
opposed to under the No-SSM simulation).  Global wheat export price volatility rises 
slightly (from 4.1% to 4.2% (Appendix Table A5) for a 0.1% increase – see Table 5) 
under the price-based SSM. Once this is taken into account, this measure appears to 
actually increase the volatility of domestic prices in most developing countries. This 
result highlights the pitfalls of approaches such as that used by Valdés and Foster (2005) 
that ignore the impacts of such a measure on world prices.  
 
Synthesis: Comparison of Price and Quantity-based Triggers 
Having analyzed the price- and quantity based SSM triggers separately, it is now 
important to compare the two types of safeguards. This can be done by contrasting results 
in the Q-SSM and P-SSM columns in tables 3-5. The first thing to note is that the 
quantity-based SSM regime (Q-SSM) tends to boost tariff-laden import prices by much 
more than the price-based SSM regime (P-SSM) in developing countries for the reasons 
discussed above. In addition, the impacts are more varied across importing countries. In 
China, Q-SSM boosts mean, duty-laden import prices by 10.2% over the No-SSM 
outcome, whereas the P-SSM regime raises them by less than 1%. Higher mean prices for 
imports in the domestic market under Q-SSM translate into lower mean import quantities. 
The quantity-based SSM also boosts domestic prices, land rents and output by a larger 
amount in all but two of the developing country regions (Other East Asia and Argentina 
are the exceptions). These larger changes are mirrored by larger output reductions in the   24
developed countries under the Q-SSM regime. This is due to the tendency of the price-
based SSM to discriminate against low unit value exporters which tend to be developing 
countries (as well as the European Union). 
Whereas the quantity-based regime boosted import price variability in all 
developing country cases (Table 3, lower panel), the price-based SSM regime has a 
mixed effect on the standard deviation of tariff-laden import prices, when compared to 
the No-SSM case. The standard deviation of import prices is lower in four of the nine 
developing country regions, while it is not lower in any of the developed country regions. 
Import volatility decreases sharply under the Q-SSM for all developing country regions, 
yet increases under the P-SSM in five of the nine developing country regions. Domestic 
price volatility rises in seven of the nine developing country regions because of the 
increase in the volatility of export prices resulting from introduction of the P-SSM. The 
Q-SSM causes an increase in domestic price volatility for all developing country regions, 
save Argentina. 
Finally, under the Q-SSM regime, the expected volume of world trade is 
substantially reduced, whereas the P-SSM regime appears to be less damaging to global 
trade levels. Both SSM regimes boost world price volatility slightly over the No-SSM 
case, as reported in Table 5.  
 
Conclusions 
The Special Safeguard Mechanism has been a controversial feature of the recent WTO 
negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda. Some advocates argue that the SSM 
is necessary in order to protect low-income domestic producers from the vagaries of 
world markets. However, economic principles suggest that widespread use of the SSM 
could destabilize world prices as well as deny domestic consumers access to affordable 
imports in the case of domestic shortages. This paper investigates the key components of 
the SSM proposal in the draft WTO Modalities of December 2008. It includes provisions 
for both quantity-based and price-based safeguard measures and shows that these 
safeguards operate in very different ways.   25
Our empirical analysis is conducted by stochastically simulating a model of the 
world wheat market. Our findings also suggest that, as specified, the Quantity-based SSM 
(Q-SSM) is an order of magnitude more damaging to world trade than its Price-based 
counterpart. Implementation of the Q-SSM policy reduces imports, raises domestic prices, 
and boosts mean domestic production in the SSM regions. Rather than insulating 
countries that use it from price volatility, this measure could actually increase price 
volatility in developing countries by restricting imports when they would otherwise 
alleviate the adverse impacts of harvest shortfalls. We estimate that implementation of 
the Q-SSM, by using the specified triggers and duties, would shrink the expected value of 
wheat imports by nearly 50% in some regions, with overall world wheat trade falling by 
4.7%. A more restrictive scenario under which the full permitted duty is used whenever 
imports have reached the trigger in the past twelve months could result in even larger 
reductions in imports and greater volatility.  
The price-based regime (P-SSM) is less damaging to world trade, as it is applied 
on a bilateral basis and most countries import wheat from a variety of sources, thereby 
diluting the impact of a safeguard tariff on  some of its suppliers. As a result, the 
reduction in world trade is far less than under the Q-SSM regime. The same is true of the 
P-SSM impacts on prices and production. Our results suggest that the P-SSM would 
actually increase the volatility of producer prices in seven out of the nine developing 
countries considered, with trading partners potentially applying the P-SSM when the 
country has a good season and increases its exports.  
Part of the rationale for the SSM is a concern that shocks from world markets 
could have adverse impacts on vulnerable producers and consumers in developing 
countries. However, by imposing the duties permitted under the SSM, developing 
countries are likely to increase, rather than decrease, the volatility of prices in domestic 
markets. If the flexibility provided under the SSM to raise protection to agricultural 
products is to be used, it is important to consider very carefully the actual impacts of such 
duties on domestic outcomes, rather than to mechanically implement the duties provided 
for under the SSM proposal.  
Unfortunately for those developing countries opting not to use the SSM, they may 
see the volatility of their producer prices increase as a result of greater world price   26
instability induced by the countries employing the SSM measures. This is particularly 
troublesome if one believes, as many feel is likely, that increased greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere will give rise to greater climate volatility and hence 
greater volatility in the production of staple food products (Ahmed et al, 2009). 
  In closing, we note that many of the main arguments in favor of the SSM focus on 
the well-being of vulnerable agricultural producers. Yet many rural residents in poor 
countries are net purchasers of food, and in many countries, urban poverty is growing 
ever more significant. In this context, the potential for policies based on the SSM rules to 
lessen poverty vulnerability seems very questionable. Future work should take into 
account the poverty dimension of the Special Safeguard Mechanism as well as the broad 
dynamics considered in this paper. 
 
 
    27
References 
 
Ahmed, A., N. Diffenbaugh and T. Hertel, (2009), “Climate Volatility Deepens Poverty 
Vulnerability in Developing Countries”, Environmental Research Letters (4) 
doi:10.1088/1748-9326/4/3/034004 
 
Arndt, C. (1996),’An Introduction to Systematic Sensitivity Analysis Via Gaussian 
Quadrature.’GTAP Technical Paper No. 2.  Available at: www.gtap.org. 
 
DeVuyst, E.A. and P.V. Preckel. (1997), ‘Sensitivity Analysis Revisited: A Quadrature-
Based Approach.’Journal of Policy Modeling 19(2):175-85. 
 
Finger, J.M. (2009), ‘A Special Safeguard Mechanism for Agricultural Imports and the 
Management of Reform’ Mimeo, Washington DC. 
 
Fraser, R. and Martin, W. (2008), ‘Price and quantity triggers in WTO agricultural 
safeguards’ Mimeo, World Bank. 
 
G-33 (2008), ‘Statement of G-33, African Group, ACP and SVEs on Special Products 
and Special Safeguard Mechanism’ Mimeo, World Trade Organization, Geneva.  
 
GATT (1994), The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
GATT Secretariat, Geneva. 
 
Grant, J. and Meilke, K. (2009), ‘Triggers, remedies, and tariff cuts: assessing the impact 
of a special safeguard mechanism for developing countries’ Estey Center Journal 
for International Law and Trade Policy 10(1):223-46. 
 
de Gorter, H., Kliauga, E. and Nassar, A. (2009), ‘How current proposals on the SSM in 
the Doha impasse matter for developing country exporters’ Instituto de Estudos  
do Comercio e Negociacoes Internacionais, Sao Paolo, Brazil.   
 
Hallaert, J. (2005), Special Agricultural Safeguards: virtual benefits and real costs—
lessons for the Doha Round, IMF Working Paper WP/05/131, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington DC. 
 
Hertel, T.H., Hummels, D., Ivanic, M. and Keeney, R. (2007). ‘How Confident can we be 
of CGE-based Assessments of Free Trade Agreements.’ Economic Modelling 
24(4):611-635. 
 
ICTSD (2008), ‘Members give mixed reactions to Lamy compromise, take a good step 
forward on services’, Bridges Daily Update,  Issue 6, 26 July, International Center 
for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva.  
   28
Keeney, R., Hertel, T.W. (2005), ‘GTAP-AGR: A Framework for Assessing the 
Implications of Multilateral Changes in Agricultural Policies.’ GTAP Technical 
Paper No. 24. 
 
Martin, W. and Alston, J. (1994), ‘A dual approach to evaluating research benefits in the 
presence of trade distortions’ American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
76(1):26-35. 
 
Martin, W. and Alston, J. (1997), ‘Producer surplus without apology?: evaluating 
investments in R&D’ Economic Record, 73(221):146-58, June.  
 
Martin, W. and Mattoo, A. (2008), The Doha Development Agenda: What’s on the 
Table? Policy Research Working Paper 4672, World Bank, Washington DC, 
August 24.  
 
Montemayor, R. (2007), Implications of Proposed Modalities for the Special Safeguard 
Mechanism A Simulation Exercise, Issue Paper No 10, International Center for 
Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva.  
 
Montemayor, R. (2008), How Will the May 2008 “Modalities” Text Affect Access to the 
Special Safeguard Mechanism, and the Effectiveness of Additional Safeguard 
Duties?, Issue Paper No 15, International Center for Trade and Sustainable 
Development, Geneva. 
 
Morrison and Sharma (2005), ‘Modalities for an SSM: product eligibility and alternative 
triggers’ Presentation to Informal ICTSD Dialog on Special Products and the 
SSM, 25 November 2005. www.ictsd.org 
 
Pearson, K. and C. Arndt. (2000), ‘Implementing Systematic Sensitivity Analysis Using 
GEMPACK.’ GTAP Technical Paper No. 3, Center for Global Trade Analysis, 
Purdue University.  
 
Schott, P. (2004), ‘Across-Product versus within-product specialization in international 
trade’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(2):647-78 
 
Sen, A. (1981), Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
 
South Centre (2009), ‘The volume-based special safeguard mechanism: analysis of the 
conditionalities in the December 2008 WTO agriculture chair’s texts’ Analytical 
Note SC/TDP/AN/AG/9, South Centre, Geneva, November. 
 
Tyers, R. and Anderson, K. (1992), Disarray in World Food Markets: a Quantitative 
Assessment, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
   29
Uri, N. and Beach, E.D. (1997), ‘A note on quality differences and United 
States/Canadian wheat trade’ Food Policy 22(4):359-67. 
 
Valdés, A. and Foster, W. (2005), The New SSM: A Price Floor Mechanism for 
Developing Countries, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development, Geneva. www.ictsd.org. 
 
Valenzuela, E., Hertel, T.W., R. Keeney and J.J. Reimer. (2007), ‘Assessing Global CGE 
Model Validity using Agricultural Price Volatility.’ American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 89(2):382-97.. 
 
Wolfe, R. (2009), The special safeguard fiasco in the WTO: the perils of inadequate 
analysis and negotiation, Working Paper, Groupe d’Economie Mondiale, Paris, 
February 10. 
 
WTO (2008a), ‘Revised draft modalities for agriculture,’ Committee on Agriculture, 
Special Session, World Trade Organization, Geneva, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4 and 
TN/AG/W/7, 6 December. 
 
WTO (2008b), An unofficial guide to agricultural safeguards: GATT, old agricultural 
(SSG) and new mechanism (SSM), 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/guide_agric_safeg_e.htm   30
 
 



















a  b  c  d e
f g  h 
do  d1  qo  q1 
t   31

































0   32
Figure 3. Potential effects of a volume-based safeguard 
 
 








q0  d0  0 
q0'  d1  q1'   33
 
Table 1. Comparison of historical and model-based outcomes (normalized 
standard deviations in year-to-year production and price percentage changes) 
          
  Production  Prices    
Region Historical  Model  Historical  Model   
AUS 28  29  17  6.4   
CHN 10  13  21  25   
JPN 14  16  4  4.5   
STHASIA 8  9  7to10  12.9   
CAN 18  21  15  4.8   
USA 13  14  16  6.1   
MEX 16  16  34  8.1   
ARG 24  24  35  11.9   
BRZ 34  35  27  46.2   
RLAmer  12  13  9 to 30  8.3   
EU15  9  11  6 to 8  6   
OEUR 15  17  20  to  28  19.1   
MENA  11  11  4 to 29  8   
Sources: Valenzuela et al. (2007) for historicals, and authors' simulations. 
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Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations for quantity-based and bilateral price-based Safeguards: percent change in power of the tariff 
Percentage Changes in Means 
Quantity-based SSM  Price-based SSM: p_TMS_SSM[wht**] 






duty  AUS CHN  JPN  OEASIA STHASIA CAN USA MEX ARG BRZ RLAmer EU15 OEUR RUS MENA SSA 
CHN 9.7  1.2  0.44  9.96  0.07  0.37  5.11  0.03  0  0.63  4.47  2.83  3.26  0.63  7.68  13.12  1.47  0.01 
OEASIA 0  0  0.38  8.15  0.01  0.07 4.07  0.02  0  0.47  5.17  1.36  3.08  0.4  7.67  13.12  0.87  0 
STHASIA 4.2  0  0.38  8.99  0.01 0.04  3.87  0.02  0  0.47  4.49  0.75 3.1  0.4  7.95  12.19  0.87 0 
MEX 4.3 0  0.46  9.96  0.07  0.21  5.11  0.03  0  0.63  4.81  2.83  3.26  0.7  8.13  13.12  1.15  0.01 
ARG 5.7  0  0.12  0  0  0  0.03  0  0  0  3.13  0  0  0  4.5  8.95  0  0 
BRZ  10.7  3.9  0.14 0.1  0  0  0.08  0  0  0  3.01 0  0  0  4.92 9.49  0  0 
RLAmer 3.9  0 0.35  7.32  0  0  3.65 0  0  0.27  4.49  0.71  3.07  0.06  8.18  12.39  0.48  0 
MENA 2.9  0  0.33  6.52  0 0  2.91  0  0  0.24  4.51  0.01  3.1  0.01  7.7  12.16  0.28  0 
SSA  3.7  0  0.3  5.02  0  0  2.46  0 0  0.22  4.52  0 2.75 0 7.8  13.07  0.15  0 
Percentage Changes in Standard Deviation  







duty  AUS CHN  JPN  OEASIA STHASIA CAN USA MEX ARG BRZ RLAmer EU15 OEUR RUS MENA SSA 
CHN 11.6  1.8  1.68  12.79  0.39  0.88  6.66  0.19  0  1.31  6.2  5.15  4.09  1.2  9.38  15.92  2.72  0.05 
OEASIA 0  0  1.55  10.93  0.07  0.24 5.65  0.1  0  1.1  6.9  2.83  3.89  0.81  9.37  15.92  2.02  0 
STHASIA 6.6  0  1.55  11.78  0.05 0.16  5.43  0.1 0 1.1  6.23  1.93  3.92 0.82  9.7  14.75  2.02 0 
MEX 6.1 0  1.69  12.79  0.39  0.54  6.66  0.19  0  1.31  6.66  5.15  4.09  1.31  9.92  15.92  2.36  0.05 
ARG 8  0  0.57  0  0  0  0.13  0  0  0  4.72  0  0  0  6.58  12.24  0  0 
BRZ  11.8  5.5 0.61  0.28  0  0  0.33  0 0 0  4.53  0 0.02 0  7.02  12.74  0  0 
RLAmer 5.9  0 1.42  10.04  0  0  5.27  0.02  0  0.76  6.23  1.86  3.89  0.24  9.98  15.01  1.41  0 
MENA 4.7  0  1.36  9.18  0 0  4.48  0  0  0.7  6.24  0.05  3.91  0.05  9.4  14.72  1.03  0 
SSA  6  0  1.24  7.57  0  0  3.98  0 0  0.63  6.26  0 3.63 0  9.52  15.86  0.72  0 
Source: Authors' simulations 
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Table 3. Percentage Changes** (SSM minus No-SSM) of mean outcomes and standard deviations for key 
variables in developing country wheat markets (percentage change from 2001 base) 
Difference in Mean Outcomes 
Import Price*  Import Quantity  Producer Price  Land Rents  Output 
Region  Q-SSM P-SSM  Q-SSM P-SSM Q-SSM P-SSM  Q-SSM P-SSM  Q-SSM  P-SSM 
CHN 10.2  0.5  -44.4  -1.6  4.7  0.1  13.9  0.3  3.4  0 
OEASIA  -0.8 0.7 0.2  0  -0.5 0.4 -2.8 2.4 -0.9  0.7 
STHASIA 3.3  0.6  -5.5  -1  1  0.1  2.7  0.3  0.8  0.1 
MEX  3.5 0.3 -5.8 -0.5 1.7 0.1 6.2 0.5 2.3  0.2 
ARG  5.8  0.5 -46.9 -7.3  -1.9 -1.5 -7.6 -6.7 -2.5  -2.6 
BRZ 14.3  0.7  -23.1  -1.3  3.5  0.1  20.4  0.6  4.6  0.3 
RLAmer 3 0.6  -6.4  -1.2 1 0.2  3.9  0.8 1.3 0.3 
MENA  2.1 0.8 -4.7 -1.6 0.7 0.2 3.4 1.2 1.2  0.5 
SSA  3  0.6  -7  -1.2 0.7 0.1 7.5 1.5 3.1  0.7 
Difference in Standard Deviations 
Import Price*  Import Quantity  Producer Price  Land Rents  Output 
Region  Q-SSM P-SSM  Q-SSM P-SSM Q-SSM P-SSM  Q-SSM P-SSM  Q-SSM  P-SSM 
CHN 10  -3.8  -54.2  51.4  5.8  18.8  15.8  -28.9  -4  -15.8 
OEASIA 0.2  0.3  0  -1.1  0.1  1.1 -0.2  -4  0  1.3 
STHASIA 2.8  -0.1  -7.5  19.6  1.3  7.5  3.4  -23.5  -1  -8.2 
MEX 2.1  0.3  -7.7  -0.1  2.3  2  -6.3  1.7  -3.3  2.5 
ARG  2.6 1.4  -48.3  51.7  -0.2  5.6  -4.8 10 -1.1  5.1 
BRZ 13  2.1  -24.7  10.2  4.3  34.3  17.8  -19.1  -5.5  11.5 
RLAmer 2.1 -4.4  -7.6  -57.5 1.9  -37.8  -5.1 2.2 -3.2 -21.9 
MENA  1.4  -11.5 -6.9  -49.4  1.1 -23.1 -2.8  -5.7  -2  -6.6 
SSA  2.1  0.2 -9.9  5.1  1  1.6 -6.4 7.3 -4.6  5.1 
Source: Authors' simulations 
*Inclusive of the duty 
**Deviations computed as (e.g.) mean of Q-SSM minus mean of No-SSM simulation. Appendix tables report original 
mean values which have been differenced to obtain the values reported here. Standard deviations reflect the variation in 
the year-to-year percentage change price and quantity variables. 
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Table 4. Percentage Changes** (SSM minus No-SSM) of mean outcomes and standard deviations for key variables in  
developed country wheat markets (percentage change from 2001 base) 
Difference in Mean Outcomes 
Import Price*  Import Quantity  Producer Price  Land Rents  Output 
Region Q-SSM P-SSM Q-SSM P-SSM Q-SSM P-SSM Q-SSM P-SSM Q-SSM P-SSM 
AUS  -0.1 -0.3 -5.0 4.5 -0.9 0.2 -6.7 0.6 -3.0 0.3 
JPN  -0.8 0.2 0.2 -0.1 -0.5 0.1 -4.2  1  -1.4 0.3 
CAN  -0.6 0.1 -2.0 0.4 -1.0 0.3 -8.8  2  -4.5 1.0 
USA  -1.0 0.2 0.7 0.3 -0.7 0.2 -4.1 1.3 -1.8 0.6 
EU15 -0.3 0.0 0.3 0.1 -0.2 0.0 -2.2 0.4 -1.3 0.2 
OEUR  -0.5 -0.5 1.8 1.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.6  -1  -0.3 -0.6 
RUS  -0.2 -0.2 1.0  0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.8 -0.2 -0.5 
Difference in Standard Deviations 
Import Price*  Import Quantity  Producer Price  Land Rents  Output 
Region Q-SSM P-SSM Q-SSM P-SSM Q-SSM P-SSM Q-SSM P-SSM Q-SSM P-SSM 
AUS  0.2 0.3 -0.3 4.9 0.2 0.2 -2.5 -1.9 -0.8 -0.7 
JPN  0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.4 0.3 0.0 0.0 
CAN  0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.9 0.2 -0.8 0.0 
USA  0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.1 -1.5  0  -0.7  -0.1 
EU15 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2  -0.1  -0.3 0.0 
OEUR  0.0 0.1 1.0 0.7 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.1  -0.5 
RUS  -0.1 0.1 1.2 0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.0 -0.6 
Source: Authors' simulations 
*Inclusive of the duty 
**Deviations computed as (e.g.) mean of Q-SSM minus mean of No-SSM simulation. Appendix tables report original mean values  
which have been differenced to obtain the values reported here. Standard deviations reflect the variation in the year-to-year percentage  
change price and quantity variables. 
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Table 5. Changes* (SSM minus No-SSM) of  mean outcomes and standard deviations for  
world wheat trade  (percentage change from 2001 base) 
Difference in Means 
Q-SSM P-SSM 
Volume -4.7  -0.5 
Price -0.8  0 
Difference in  Standard Deviation 
Q-SSM P-SSM 
Volume -2.1  0.1 
Price 0.1  0.1 
Source: Authors' simulations *Deviations computed as (e.g.) mean of Q-SSM minus mean of 
No-SSM simulation. Appendix tables report original mean values which have been 
differenced to obtain the values reported here. Standard deviations reflect the variation in the 
year-to-year percentage change price and quantity variables. 
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Table 6. Relative global export price ratio (PR) and bilateral import price ratios (BIPR) developing country exporters  
BIPR: Developing Country Wheat Importers 
Exporter  PR  CHN  OEASIA  STHASIA  MEX ARG BRZ RLAmer MENA  SSA 
CHN 0.97  0.87  0.89  0.88  0.87  1.05  1.04  0.9  0.91  0.93 
OEASIA 1  0.89  0.91 0.91 0.9  1.09  1.08  0.93  0.94  0.96 
STHASIA 0.96  0.86  0.88  0.88  0.86  1.04 1.03  0.89  0.9  0.92 
MEX 1.15  1.03  1.05  1.05  1.03  1.25  1.24  1.07 1.08  1.1 
ARG 0.89  0.85 0.85  0.85 0.85  0.97 0.96  0.85 0.85  0.85 
BRZ 1.05  0.94  0.96  0.96  0.94  1.14  1.13  0.97 0.99  1 
RLAmer 0.9  0.85 0.85  0.85 0.85  0.98 0.97  0.85 0.85  0.86 
MENA 1  0.89  0.91  0.91  0.9  1.09  1.08  0.93  0.94  0.96 
SSA 1.15  1.03  1.05  1.05  1.03  1.25  1.24  1.07  1.08  1.1 
Developed Country Exporters 
         BIPR: Developing Country Wheat Importers 
Exporter  PR  CHN  OEASIA  STHASIA  MEX ARG BRZ RLAmer MENA  SSA 
AUS 1.1  0.98  1 1  0.99  1.19  1.18  1.02  1.03  1.05 
JPN 1.03  0.92  0.94  0.94  0.92  1.12  1.11  0.95  0.97  0.99 
CAN 1.14  1.02  1.04  1.04  1.02  1.24  1.23  1.06 1.07  1.09 
USA 1.1  0.98  1 1  0.99  1.19  1.18  1.02  1.03  1.05 
EU15 0.98  0.88  0.89  0.89  0.88  1.06  1.05  0.91  0.92  0.94 
OEUR  0.85 0.85  0.85  0.85  0.85 0.92 0.91  0.85 0.85  0.85 
RUS  0.85 0.85  0.85  0.85  0.85 0.92 0.91  0.85 0.85  0.85 
Source: Authors' calculations via COMTRADE and GTAP6 Databases 
Notes: PR is the average of each exporter’s unit value divided by the world average export unit value from 2000 to 2004.  BIPR equals PR divided by the 
2001 weighted average import price for each importing region. Italicized values (0.85) have been truncated for purposes of incorporation into the model, 
for which this represents trigger point for the P-SSM. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Percentage change in mean and standard deviations for key variables in developing country wheat markets (% change), Q-SSM 
  
Percentage Change in Mean Outcomes
   Import Price*  Import Quantity  Producer Price  Land Rents  Output 
Region  No SSM  SSM  No SSM  SSM  No SSM  SSM  No SSM  SSM  No SSM  SSM 
CHN 0.5  10.7  41.1  -3.3  3.7  8.4  -3.7  10.2  -2.1  1.3 
OEASIA 0.3  -0.5  0 0.2  0.7 0.2  2.8  0  0.4  -0.5 
STHASIA 0.1  3.4  3.3 -2.2  1.3  2.3  -0.1  2.6  -0.3  0.5 
MEX 0.6  4.1  1.8  -4  1  2.7  1.5 7.7  0.7  3 
ARG   -1.7  4.1  41.3  -5.6  4.2  2.3  10.9  3.3  3.9  1.4 
BRZ 2.3  16.6  19.4  -3.7  16.1  19.6  2.7  23.1  0.7  5.3 
RLAmer 0.3  3.3 3.3  -3.1  1.2  2.2  2.2  6.1  0.9  2.2 
MENA -0.2  1.9  2.5  -2.2  0.5  1.2  -1  2.4  -0.3  0.9 
SSA -0.1  2.9  3.1  -3.9  0.8  1.5  -2 5.5  -0.7 2.4 
Percentage Change in Standard Deviations
   Import Price*  Import Quantity  Producer Price  Land Rents  Output 
Region  No SSM  SSM  No SSM  SSM  No SSM  SSM  No SSM  SSM  No SSM  SSM 
CHN 4.1  14.1  110.3  56.1  25  30.8  11.6  27.4  12.8 8.8 
OEASIA 4.6  4.8 0.9  0.9  5.5 5.6 29.8  29.6  16.9  16.9 
STHASIA 4.4 7.2  20.4 12.9  12.9 14.2  6.1  9.5  8.7  7.7 
MEX 4.7  6.8  22.1  14.4  8.1  10.4  17.6  11.3  16.4 13.1 
ARG   6  8.6  69.5  21.2  11.9  11.7  29.6  24.8  23.7  22.6 
BRZ 8.7  21.7  79.2  54.5  46.2  50.5  11.2 29  35.2  29.7 
RLAmer 4.2  6.3  21.6  14  8.3  10.2  13.8  8.7  13.4  10.2 
MENA 3.9  5.3  20  13.1  8  9.1  8.6  5.8  11.1  9.1 
SSA 4  6.1  25.3  15.4  9.6  10.6  15.8  9.4 16.1  11.5 
Source: Authors' simulations.   * Inclusive of the duty 
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Table A2. Percentage Change in mean and standard deviations for key variables in developed country wheat markets 
 (percentage change from 2001 base) Quantity Based SSM 
Percentage Change in Mean Outcomes 
   Import Price*  Import Quantity  Producer Price  Land Rents  Output 
Region  No SSM  SSM  No SSM  SSM  No SSM  SSM  No SSM  SSM  No SSM  SSM 
AUS -7.4  -7.5  57.7 52.7 1  0.1  6.1  -0.6  2.5  -0.5 
JPN 0.4  -0.4  0  0.2  0.6  0.1  4.6  0.4  0.6  -0.8 
CAN -1  -1.6  10.7  8.7  1  0  8.1  -0.7 3.8  -0.7 
USA   0.5  -0.5  4.1  4.8  1  0.3  3.3  -0.8  1.5  -0.3 
EU15 -0.2  -0.5  1.7 2  0.6  0.4 2  -0.2  1.2  -0.1 
OEUR -2  -2.5  28.7  30.5  3.2  3.1  0.2 -0.4  0  -0.3 
RUS   -3.1  -3.3  42.7  43.7  7.3  7.2  0.5  0.2  -1.5  -1.7 
Percentage Change in Standard Deviations
   Import Price*  Import Quantity  Producer Price  Land Rents  Output 
Region  No SSM  SSM  No SSM  SSM  No SSM  SSM  No SSM  SSM  No SSM  SSM 
AUS 8  8.2  58.2  57.9  6.4  6.6  41  38.5  28.5  27.7 
JPN  4.5 4.6  2  2.1 4.5  4.6 34.6  34.2  15.6  15.6 
CAN 5.1  5.2  20.8  20.6  4.8  4.8  30.2  28.3  20.7  19.9 
USA   4.4  4.4  22.2  22.6  6.1  6.3  16  14.5  13.9  13.2 
EU15 4.6  4.6  3.8  3.9  6 6  11.5  11.3 11.3  11 
OEUR 4.6  4.6  68 69  19.1  19 5.6  5.6  16.8  16.7 
RUS    15.5 15.4 69.3  70.5 31.1  31  14.2  14.2  17.7  17.7 
Source: Authors’ simulations *Inclusive of the duty 
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Table A3. Percentage change in mean and standard deviations for key variables in developing country wheat markets 
 (percentage change from 2001 base) Price Based Safeguard 
Percentage Change in Mean Outcomes 
   Import Price*  Import Quantity  Producer Price  Land Rents  Output 
Region  No SSM  SSM  No SSM  SSM  No SSM SSM No  SSM SSM No  SSM  SSM 
CHN 0.5  1  41.1  39.5  3.7  3.8 -3.7 -3.4 -2.1  -2.1 
OEASIA  0.3  1  0  0  0.7 1.1 2.8 5.2 0.4  1.1 
STHASIA  0.1 0.7 3.3 2.3 1.3 1.4 -0.1 0.2 -0.3  -0.2 
MEX  0.6 0.9 1.8 1.3  1  1.1 1.5  2  0.7  0.9 
ARG  -1.7 -1.2 41.3  34  4.2  2.7 10.9 4.2  3.9  1.3 
BRZ  2.3  3 19.4  18.1 16 16.1  2.7 3.3 0.7  1 
RLAmer  0.3 0.9 3.3 2.1 1.2 1.4 2.2  3  0.9  1.2 
MENA  -0.2 0.6 2.5 0.9 0.5 0.7  -1  0.2 -0.3  0.2 
SSA  -0.1 0.5 3.1 1.9 0.8 0.9  -2 -0.5  -0.7  0 
Percentage Change in Standard Deviations 
   Import Price*  Import Quantity  Producer Price  Land Rents  Output 
   No SSM  SSM  No SSM  SSM  No SSM SSM  No  SSM SSM  No  SSM SSM 
CHN  8  4.2 58.2  109.6 6.4 25.2 41 12.1  28.5  12.7 
OEASIA  4.5 4.8  2  0.9 4.5 5.6  34.6  30.6  15.6  16.9 
STHASIA  4.6 4.5 0.9 20.5 5.5 13 29.8  6.3  16.9  8.7 
MEX  4.4 4.7  22.2  22.1 6.1 8.1 16 17.7  13.9  16.4 
ARG  4.7  6.1  22.1 73.8  8.1  13.7 17.6 27.6 16.4  21.5 
BRZ  6  8.1  69.5 79.7 11.9 46.2 29.6 10.5 23.7  35.2 
RLAmer  8.7  4.3 79.2 21.7 46.2 8.4 11.2  13.4  35.2  13.3 
MENA  15.5 4 69.3  19.9  31.1 8 14.2  8.5  17.7  11.1 
SSA  3.9 4.1 20 25.1  8  9.6 8.6  15.9  11.1  16.2 
Source: Authors' simulations. * Inclusive of the duty 
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Table A4. Percentage change in mean and standard deviations for key variables in developed country wheat markets 
 (percentage change from 2001 base) Price Based SSM 
Developed Country Markets 
   Import Price*  Import Quantity  Producer Price  Land Rents  Output 
Region  No SSM  SSM  No SSM  SSM  No SSM SSM  No  SSM SSM  No  SSM SSM 
AUS -7.4  -7.7  57.7  62.2  1  1.2  6.1  6.7  2.5  2.8 
JPN  0.4 0.6  0  -0.1 0.6 0.7 4.6 5.6 0.6 0.9 
CAN -1  -0.9  10.7  11.1  1  1.3  8.1  10.1  3.8  4.8 
USA  0.5 0.7 4.1 4.4  1  1.2 3.3 4.6 1.5 2.1 
EU15  -0.2  -0.2 1.7 1.8 0.6 0.6  2  2.4 1.2 1.4 
OEUR  -2  -2.5  28.7  30  3.2 3 0.2  -0.8 0 -0.6 
RUS -3.1  -3.3  42.7 42.9  7.3  7.1  0.5  -0.3 -1.5  -2 
Developed Country Markets 
   Import Price*  Import Quantity  Producer Price  Land Rents  Output 
Region  No SSM  SSM  No SSM  SSM  No SSM SSM  No  SSM SSM  No  SSM SSM 
AUS  8  8.3  58.2 63.1  6.4  6.6  41  39.1 28.5 27.8 
JPN  4.5 4.5  2  2  4.5 4.5  34.6  34.9  15.6  15.6 
CAN  5.1  5.1  20.8 20.8  4.8  4.8  30.2 30.4 20.7 20.7 
USA  4.4 4.4  22.2  22.2  6.1 6.2 16  16 13.9  13.8 
EU15  4.6 4.6 3.8 3.8  6  6 11.5  11.4  11.3  11.3 
OEUR  4.6  4.7  68  68.7 19.1 19.2  5.6  5.8  16.8 16.3 
RUS  15.5 15.6 69.3 69.6 31.1 31.2 14.2 14.9 17.7 17.1 
Source: Authors' simulations 
* Inclusive of the duty 
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Table A5. Impacts on World Wheat Trade 
Mean 
Baseline Q-SSM P-SSM 
Volume  7.3 2.6  6.8 
Price  0.1 -0.7  0.1 
Std Deviation 
Baseline Q-SSM P-SSM 
Volume  7.8 5.7  7.9 
Price  4.1 4.2  4.2 
Source: Authors' simulations 
 